*By Jerome Aduojo Agi, Ph.D.*
Nigeria’s worsening security challenges have transformed the debate over state police from a theoretical constitutional question into an urgent national conversation. Terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, communal violence, armed robbery, cultism, farmer-herder conflicts, oil theft and attacks on rural communities have exposed serious weaknesses in the country’s highly centralised policing structure.
However, the fundamental question is not simply whether Nigeria needs state police. The more important question is whether Nigeria’s political institutions, leaders, security agencies and citizens are prepared to operate state police professionally, impartially and within the rule of law.
State Police may bring security closer to the people, but without constitutional safeguards, independent oversight, sustainable funding and political restraint, it could also bring coercion, electoral intimidation and human-rights abuses closer to them.
*WHAT ARE STATE POLICE AND POLICING?*
Policing is broader than arresting suspected offenders or carrying firearms. It encompasses crime prevention, criminal investigation, maintenance of public order, protection of lives and property, traffic control, intelligence gathering, emergency response, community engagement and enforcement of lawful court orders.
State Police refers to a law-enforcement institution established, funded and administered by a subnational government. In Nigeria, this would mean police services created by individual states and operating alongside the Nigeria Police Force.
The concept is not unusual in federal systems. Countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Germany operate different forms of national, federal, state, provincial or local policing. Nevertheless, these systems did not emerge merely because decentralisation was fashionable. They developed within constitutional arrangements that defined jurisdiction, funding, command, accountability and relationships among different levels of law enforcement.
Nigeria’s policing history began during the colonial period with separate constabularies created primarily to enforce colonial authority. The Lagos Consular Guard was established in 1861, while other regional and native-authority police formations subsequently emerged. These formations were eventually consolidated into the Nigeria Police Force in 1930.
The colonial experience also left Nigeria with difficult memories of local police institutions being used by regional and local authorities against political opponents. Following Military intervention and the increasing centralisation of government, the Nigeria Police Force became the country’s single constitutionally recognised police institution.
*Section 214 of the Constitution establishes the Nigeria Police Force and provides that no other police force shall be established for Nigeria or any part of it except as authorised by the Constitution* . Consequently, the creation of State Police requires a Constitutional amendment, not merely an executive announcement or ordinary legislation. The current reform process has advanced significantly : in June 2026, the National Assembly approved Constitutional changes permitting States to establish Police Services, but the amendment still requires approval by at least two-thirds of the State Houses of Assembly before completion of the Constitutional process. (Constitutional provision | Legislative development).
*HAS THE NIGERIA POLICE FORCE BEEN ADEQUATELY UTILISED AND EQUIPPED?*
The honest answer is NO.
Nigeria has not fully equipped, staffed, trained or professionally deployed the Nigeria Police Force to meet the security demands of its population, geographical size and increasingly complex criminal environment.
Many Police formations operate with inadequate vehicles, communications equipment, forensic facilities, protective gear, modern investigative technology and suitable accommodation. Officers are frequently required to confront heavily armed criminal organisations under difficult conditions. Police training institutions have also suffered years of deterioration—serious enough for the National Economic Council in December 2025 to approve, subject to presidential ratification, ₦100 billion for the rehabilitation of Police and other Security-Agency training institutions. (State House report).
The Force is also overstretched. Large numbers of officers have historically been assigned to protect political officeholders, wealthy individuals and other privileged persons, while many communities have little or no effective police presence. In December 2025, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu reaffirmed a directive to withdraw Police Officers from VIP protection, stating that Police personnel were trained to protect citizens, especially the vulnerable, rather than a small privileged class.
That directive acknowledged a longstanding distortion in Police deployment. When a Politician moves with a convoy containing several armed officers while an entire rural community has no functional Police post, policing has ceased to reflect equal citizenship.
Before creating 36 additional Police institutions, Nigeria must therefore ask whether the country has exhausted the possibilities of reforming, expanding, equipping and properly deploying the existing Force. State Police should not become an excuse for abandoning the Nigeria Police Force. Nigeria will still require a strong Federal Police institution to address terrorism, interstate crime, cybercrime, trafficking, organised crime, national intelligence and other offences that cross state boundaries.
*IS STATE POLICE NECESSARY?*
There is a compelling argument for decentralised policing.
Nigeria is too large, diverse and security-challenged to depend entirely on operational instructions flowing from Abuja. A Police Officer recruited from or assigned permanently to a community may understand its language, terrain, culture, leadership structure and conflict patterns better than an officer posted there temporarily from another part of the country.
Local knowledge can improve intelligence gathering, reduce response time and strengthen cooperation between the police and residents. State Police could also allow security strategies to reflect the different realities confronting states—from banditry and kidnapping to oil theft, cult violence, urban crime, communal conflict and attacks on agricultural communities.
Yet necessity alone does not guarantee success. A poorly designed State Police system could multiply the weaknesses of the existing Force by 36. Instead of one institution struggling with inadequate funding, political interference and public mistrust, Nigeria could create several institutions suffering from the same problems.
The objective must not be decentralisation for its own sake. It must be safer communities, professional policing and equal protection under the law.
*WHERE IS THE OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT?*
No State Police System should commence until Nigerians can examine a comprehensive constitutional, legislative, financial and operational blueprint.
The blueprint must clearly define the responsibilities of the federal and state police. The Federal Police could retain jurisdiction over terrorism, treason, border security, interstate kidnapping, cybercrime, human trafficking, organised crime, attacks on federal institutions and other offences with national or cross-border implications.
State Police could take primary responsibility for offences occurring within their states, community patrols, public-order management, local intelligence, traffic enforcement and rapid response to local emergencies.
But difficult questions remain :
– What happens when a crime begins in one state and continues into another?
– Which police service will investigate offences involving a governor or senior state official?
– Can state police arrest a federal official?
– Who takes command during a national emergency?
– How will intelligence be shared?
– What happens when federal and state police issue conflicting instructions?
– Who controls firearms, databases, forensic evidence and detention facilities?
– Can a governor direct the arrest of a political opponent?
– What remedies will be available to citizens who are unlawfully detained or injured?
Unless these questions are answered before implementation, rivalry, confusion and jurisdictional conflict may weaken rather than improve national security.
*WHO WILL STATE POLICE BENEFIT?*
Properly designed state police will benefit Nigerians by improving local presence, intelligence gathering and emergency response. Improperly designed State Police may benefit governors, political parties and influential interests.
Nigeria’s history of political intolerance makes this concern legitimate. Security agencies have repeatedly faced accusations of selective enforcement, intimidation of protesters, disruption of opposition activities and involvement in electoral controversies. Placing a Police Service directly under a Governor without strong Constitutional restraints could provide State Executives with a powerful instrument against political opponents, journalists, activists, traditional rulers, labour leaders and dissenting citizens.
A Governor must not be permitted to appoint and remove a State Commissioner of Police solely at personal discretion. Recruitment, promotion, discipline and removal should be handled by an independent State Police Service Commission composed of representatives of the judiciary, civil society, professional bodies, traditional institutions, women, youth, persons with disabilities and the security sector.
Operational independence must be protected by law. Lawful civilian oversight is necessary, but partisan operational control is dangerous.
*CAN VIGILANTES, HUNTERS AND THE NIGERIAN LEGION PERFORM THE ROLE?*
Nigeria already has vigilante organisations, hunters’ groups, neighbourhood-watch structures, forest guards and retired military personnel under the Nigerian Legion. These organisations possess valuable knowledge of local terrain, community relationships and suspicious movements. They have contributed to the protection of communities where conventional security agencies are absent or overstretched.
They should be recognised, screened, trained and appropriately integrated into a national community-safety framework. However, they cannot fully replace a professional police institution.
Vigilante and hunters’ organisations often lack standardised recruitment, forensic capacity, formal investigative powers, evidence-management procedures, human-rights training, secure detention facilities and consistent disciplinary systems. Unregulated groups may also be infiltrated by criminals, ethnic militias or political interests.
The answer is neither to discard them nor to transform every local group into an armed Police Service. They should operate as trained community-safety auxiliaries under clearly defined law, biometric registration, background checks, codes of conduct and professional police supervision.
The Nigerian Legion can also contribute through intelligence support, emergency coordination, mentoring, training and community-security programmes. Retired military personnel possess valuable experience, but military experience alone does not automatically provide the legal and professional training required for civilian policing.
Community Policing must remain civilian, accountable and service-oriented.
*ARE POLITICAL LEADERS PREPARED TO CONTROL STATE POLICE RESPONSIBLY?*
This may be the most important question.
The success of State Police will depend not only on constitutional language but on the character of those who exercise authority. Political leaders must possess the emotional maturity to tolerate criticism, the psychological discipline to respect opposition, the democratic temperament to permit peaceful protest and the moral courage to allow investigations involving their supporters.
– Can a Governor permit State Police to investigate a commissioner, relative, political ally or party chairman?
– Can State Police protect an opposition rally without intimidation?
– Can they refuse an unlawful order from the Governor?
– Can they investigate electoral violence allegedly committed by members of the ruling party?
If the answer to these questions is uncertain, Nigeria is not yet institutionally prepared.
The country must not place coercive power in the hands of leaders who interpret disagreement as disloyalty and political opposition as criminality. State Police cannot be built upon the assumption that every Governor will be fair. Constitutions are designed not only for good leaders but also to restrain bad ones.
*FUNDING AND ACCOUNTABILITY.*
State Police will require enormous and recurring expenditure. Salaries, pensions, insurance, stations, barracks, vehicles, uniforms, weapons, communications systems, forensic laboratories, training institutions and digital infrastructure cannot be sustained by slogans.
Some states struggle to pay workers and pensioners promptly. If they cannot guarantee predictable police salaries, the result may be extortion, corruption, desertion or criminal infiltration. *A poorly paid and heavily armed officer is a public danger.*
Every participating State should be required to establish a protected State Police Fund supported by transparent appropriations. Federal grants may assist poorer states, but access should depend on compliance with national training, auditing and human-rights standards. Police expenditure must be audited annually and published.
Accountability should not rest exclusively with the Governor or Police command. Nigeria needs :
– Independent federal and state police service commissions;
– Civilian police-complaints authorities with investigative powers;
– Legislative oversight hearings open to the public;
– Mandatory judicial review of prolonged detention;
– Public registers of deaths in custody and police shootings;
– Body-worn cameras for designated operations;
– Published use-of-force policies;
– Accessible compensation mechanisms for victims;
– Protection for whistleblowers within the police;
– Strict sanctions for officers and commanders who conceal misconduct; and
– Personal liability for officials who knowingly issue unlawful orders.
Command responsibility must be clearly established. Senior Officers should not escape accountability when abuses result from unlawful instructions, institutional negligence or deliberate failure to supervise subordinates.
*CORRUPTION, EXTORTION AND POLICE BRUTALITY.*
Allegations of extortion, unlawful detention, brutality, extrajudicial killing, collaboration with criminal groups and interference with investigations have damaged public confidence in the Nigeria Police Force. These allegations must not be treated as proof against every police officer. Thousands of officers continue to serve courageously under dangerous and difficult conditions, and many have lost their lives protecting citizens.
Nevertheless, institutional loyalty must never become a shield against accountability.
The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) is empowered to investigate alleged human-rights violations, while the Police Act 2020 introduced reforms intended to strengthen professionalism and accountability. Yet laws and investigative panels will achieve little if recommendations are ignored, prosecutions are delayed, victims are not compensated and disciplined officers quietly return to service.
Responsibility is shared. Political leaders who interfere with investigations are responsible. Police commanders who tolerate misconduct are responsible. Legislatures that fail to provide resources and oversight are responsible. Courts that allow cases to remain unresolved indefinitely contribute to impunity. Citizens who bribe officers, provide false information or protect criminals also weaken the system.
The goal must not be to condemn the entire Nigeria Police Force. It must be to build an institution in which good officers are supported, corrupt officers are exposed, victims receive justice and the public can trust the law.
Creating State Police without first addressing these failures risks decentralising corruption, brutality and political interference.
*NIGERIA MUST NOT COPY FOREIGN MODELS BLINDLY.*
Nigeria should not establish State Police merely because developed countries operate decentralised law-enforcement systems. Institutional arrangements cannot simply be imported without considering history, political culture, economic capacity and the strength of accountability institutions.
Decentralised policing works best where local governments have reliable revenue, independent courts, strong legislatures, professional civil services, effective civilian oversight and a culture of obedience to lawful institutional limits.
Nigeria must adopt what suits its realities. State Police may be necessary, but necessity does not eliminate the need for preparation.
Implementation should therefore be gradual. A pilot phase could begin in States that demonstrate adequate funding, operational readiness, independent oversight and compliance with national standards. The programme should undergo periodic public evaluation before expansion.
*CONDITIONS THAT MUST PRECEDE TAKE-OFF.*
Before State Police become operational, Nigeria should establish the following safeguards :
1) A constitutional division of responsibilities between federal and state police;
2) National minimum standards for recruitment, training, remuneration and discipline;
3) Independent police service and complaints commissions;
4) Secure and transparent funding arrangements;
5) Prohibition of state-police deployment for partisan political purposes;
6) Judicially enforceable penalties for obeying manifestly unlawful orders;
7) Uniform national standards for arrest, detention, interrogation and use of force;
8) A shared criminal-intelligence and forensic-information system;
9) Clear rules for interstate pursuit and joint operations;
10) Protection of journalists, peaceful protesters and opposition parties;
11) Mandatory publication of audited accounts and misconduct statistics;
12) Integration of screened community-security organisations under lawful supervision; and
13) Periodic review by the National Assembly, state legislatures, courts and independent civil institutions.
*CONCLUSION : REFORM BEFORE REPLICATION.*
Nigeria needs policing that is present, professional, properly equipped, locally informed and trusted by the people. The existing centralised structure has not adequately protected many communities, and the case for decentralisation is therefore strong.
But State Police is not a magical solution. A new uniform, name and command structure will not automatically produce better security. If the existing culture of political interference, inadequate funding, corruption, extortion and weak accountability is transferred to the states, Nigeria will merely reproduce old failures on a wider scale.
The decisive question is not whether Governors should have their own Police Forces. It is whether every Nigerian—regardless of political affiliation, ethnicity, religion, wealth or social status—will receive equal protection from those forces.
State Police must be established for citizens, not politicians; for justice, not intimidation; for community security, not electoral conquest.
Nigeria should proceed, but it must proceed carefully. The country must first build the laws, institutions, funding systems and accountability mechanisms that will prevent State Police from becoming instruments of personal power.
Until Political Leaders learn to respect institutional boundaries and citizens insist on transparency and equal justice, the danger will remain that a reform intended to protect Nigerians could become another weapon against them.
State Police may be necessary. But readiness, restraint and accountability will determine whether it becomes a blessing or a burden to the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
